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Abstract
CIVIL WAR INCENTIVES, IDENTITIES, AND GROUP ALLEGIANCES IN SYRIA’S
CONTESTED PROVINCES: A CASE STUDY ON CIVIL WAR
by
HILARY WEITZE
Adviser: Susan L. Woodward
This project seeks to answer the following questions: Why did the 2011 Syrian Revolution
transition into a civil war? What contributed to the popularity of rebel efforts in the
countryside? This case study on the Syrian Civil War begins by characterizing key events in
the current civil war setting in order to characterize the nature of participation on the insurgent
side of the conflict. Further, this project sets out to identify key events and actors in their
respective geographic and demographic frameworks in order to identify the nature of
participants and their respective characteristics. I will ultimately draw a connecting line
between the nature and degree of insurgent participation by speculating on grievances. The
latter process is identified as originating in the re-arrangement of the domestic economy. In
other words, I argue that the local origins of the insurgency are a product of the breakdown in
the dynamics between group actors and their respective economic institutions. The last
discussion will allow the author to offer insight into the relationship between macro-level
determinants of civil war and the micro-foundations of identification with and/or participation
among insurgent efforts. The nature and origins of political grievances will be discussed at the
end of this project.
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Overview
This project focuses on the nature and composition of political grievances to the extent
that they can shed light on the particular patterns of violent conflict in the case of Syria. The
central thesis of this project is that a breakdown in the structure of specific sectors in the
national economy cultivated an anti-regime fervor among local actors in the remote areas. The
monopoly over power afforded to the regime in Syria was atrophied by the transition to the
liberal model of development. Through structural adjustments to the national economy, the
regime’s centrality among particular demographics in the total population were retracted and
replaced by non-state actors. This, it follows, ultimately tipped the events toward a sustained
insurgency. This is owed to the nature and ideology of economic liberalization.123
This project begins by finding the antecedent4 conditions and structural components that,
the author speculates, are the springboard for the current war period in the case of Syria. The
design of this project is qualitative and in a case study format. The methodology utilized to
connect causal linkages is known as process tracing.5 This project sets out to trace the processes
of institutional breakdown at the state level in Syria and to ultimately, link the causal
mechanisms6 which connect antecedent variables to the politics of the present civil war context.
As process tracing requires backtracking through events, the assessment begins in the most
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Sambanis, N., (2010) “What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an
Operational Definition,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 pp. 814-858.
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Woodward, S., (1995), Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War,
Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution.
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Wood, E.J., (2003) Insurgent Collective Action in El Salvador.
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Van Evera, S., (2006) “Guide to Methods in Political Science,” chapter 3.
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(Checkel 2006) “Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” International Studies Review 8, no. 2, pp. 1.
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Checkel, J. T., (2006) “Tracing Causal Mechanisms,” International Studies Review 8, no. 2, pp.
362-364.
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recent context and ends with a discussion about changes to the nature of the domestic economy.
A discussion about the nature of civil war violence will take place in the context of the
Provinces of Homs, Damascus, and Idlib Provinces. These contested areas are given special
attention because they allow for a more careful discussion about the nature of allegiance
patterns among rural non-combatants. Further, these geographic areas are isolated because
they contain elements of multiple variables affecting civil war onset as the abovementioned
geographic areas contain elements of urban as well as rural warfare as well as insurgent and
incumbent allegiance among specific groups. In order to understand the present situation in
Syria in a manner that is relevant to extant comparative scholarship, (one that allows for
speculation into the possible outcomes to the war) this project begins with a delineation of
significant war events wherein the tool of social scientific research is process tracing. After a
discussion on key events in the war, a discussion about the nature of participation will ensue.
Finally, this project will derive the structural components that, it is argued, contributed to the
breakdown of Syrian state capacity and led ultimately to a lasting insurgency in the rural areas
and among local actors.

2

Homs Province

Homs’ initiation into hostilities began early in the war. In Homs, the Free Syrian Army began as
defectors from the regular military. This embryonic insurgency consisted of low ranking members
of the enlisted national forces who were exclusively trained in regular-style combat. Hence, these
fighters relied heavily on tanks as well as campaigns against the regime that required constant
reinforcements of human and material power. The early FSA failed due to these combined factors
as well as the dependence on regime weapons for liberating territory. This is especially true in
land-locked and suburban areas. In tactical terms, the insurgent war of position was doomed:
FSA did not have nearly a fraction of the military capacity afforded to the regime making the
ultimate goal of annexing territory particularly hard.
The insurgency in Syria began with large-scale military defections from regular forces
in the national army. The Free Syrian Army were first mobilized in Homs Province in the
neighborhood of Bab Amr. Experimental in nature and reliant on weapons from regime
depots, Bab Amr’s modernist approach to warfare proved costly. The FSA in Homs’ suburbs
suffered under the imposition of sanctions imposed on regular forces, resulting in a shortage of
supplies and in the FSA’s ultimate entrenchment into the black market. This stymieing of the
FSA’s tactical capabilities also resulted in a limitation of movement for the long term. This
stagnation in securing military supplies made Homs the example not to follow for future
participants in efforts to dismantle the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Following this first stage of defections were the following events: a ground
bombardment by regime forces, an FSA counter-offensive and the loss of annexed territory. In
3

the first phase, tanks were introduced into Homs’ urban and suburban centers early on with a
stated intention of driving out insurgent efforts. In the case of Homs, the option of staying
alive outweighed the requisite ideological and political commitments of the revolutionary
movement. Secondly, where rebel efforts were choked off by the regime’s ground forces and
in cases such as the neighborhoods of Bab Amr, indiscriminate regime shelling of civilian
infrastructure cleared space for Islamic Front topographical gains. Rebel efforts took the form
of an attrition campaign, whereby geographic as well as political sovereignty were prizes in
the coordinated effort. As the conflict escalated, either side began to splinter into smaller
brigades. The competition for territory among itinerant factions ultimately complicated efforts
to remain faithful to the original goals of the uprising.
The regime bombardment of Homs’ suburban infrastructure incentivized the use of
selective violence7 by regime forces in many forms. Ground offenses were supplemented by
air bombardments in which military aircraft targeted non-combatant infrastructure including,
hospitals, schools, housing, and bread queues. This undercuts the theory of an ontology8 of
civil war within the “old war” context, broadly.9 Political relevancy became less important (as
many Syrian nationals were now refugees in neighboring Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the
like), limiting the degrees of allegiance in the countryside as well as between the
communication networks of the Syrian National Coalition (Turkish based) SNC/SNCHR/FSA
operatives stationed in remote areas, and civilian enclaves, many of whom chose to evacuate
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Kalyvas, S., (2003), “What is Political Violence? On the Ontology of Civil War,” Perspectives
on Politics, 1:3, p. 477.
8
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A., (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War, pp. 566-567
9
Kaldor, M., (2006), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, pp. 1-32.
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as asylum seekers.10 This created a vacuum of leadership among combatants, coordinating
committees, and local and regional ex-patriated groups. In the context of indigenous bodies of
interested parties—combatant and non— the opportunity structure shifted in such a manner
that rather than having to please local coordinates with acquisitions that made strategic sense
for the long term political goals of the LCCs, the incentive became characterized by
opportunism.11
This stagnation of FSA mobility thus owed in part to a failure to remain mobile and
annex territory without incurring heavy civilian and insurgent casualties, particularly in the
case of Homs.12 The nature of the siege and blockade of Homs by regular regime forces a
“fight or flight” scenario for civilians. The two sides of decision making in the Homs
experience involved either waiting out the escalated regime bombardment or opt to become an
asylum seeker.
When war began and foreign factions and FSA groups became active combatants in the
countryside, LCCs were crucial in documenting and delineating the events as they unfolded,
archiving incentives and group dynamics, deductively. The LCCs were central to coordinated
efforts in tandem with community members and were horizontally organized in the early stage
of the conflict. LCCs elected representative bodies and projected the political sentiment of
civilian allies onto the organization of rebel forces.13

10

BBC News (2014), “Syria crisis: Concern for Homs refugees” retrieved, February 12, 2014.
Fearon, J.D., Laitin, D., (2003) “Ethnicity Insurgency and Civil War,” p.101.
12
BBC News, “Syria crisis: Concern for Homs refugees” (2014) ibid.
13
al-Kafri, M. A., (2002),“Climate and Incentives of Investment in Syria,” ibid.
11

5

Damascus Province
The political landscape of Damascus is such that the most powerful political actors and
state institutional power are located in the center of the city in the Mezzeh District with
tangential networks of regime sanctioned economic, military and soft power- sharing function
in the slightly off-centered geographic areas such as Mezzeh, which is west of the central
regime’s institutional functionaries. The political leadership of the Ba’ath Party, the regime
itself, and the Autonomous Ba’athists in the Military are among the Presidential Guard, and
located in government buildings in the precise center of Damascus, proper. In other words, the
regime’s heart and mind are located in the Old City (central), its lungs are directly west of the
Old Gate, and its nourishment (intelligence gathering subsidiaries) is diffuse in the Province’s
outlying areas yet the hand that feeds such actors is operational in a multitude of positions,
formal and in the shadows, in the remainder of the contested Governates.
Political power is concentrated along the eastern corridor of the innermost gates of the
old city, in Damascus. This area is densely populated according to the most recent pre-war
data on populations in the Province. The UNHCR reports in 2006 relatively low (in the tens
of thousands) numbers of Syrian nationals seeking asylum or refugee status outside of
Syria.14 Likewise, in Damascus, regime/rebel hostilities have been the heaviest, the most
deaths as a result of war have been documented in the Damascus countryside. In order to
best contextualize the tactical arrangements and the broad trajectory of war related violence,
14

UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, “2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile Syrian Arab
Republic,” accessed May 2, 2014, from www.unhcr.org.
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we must start with the first province to which such claims to insurgency can be made.
Dera’a’s remoteness as well as the nature of horizontal organization in the Bedouin southeast
made it difficult to reconcile the need to express outrage over regime repression
(traditionally through a public funeral procession) wherein regime forces fired randomly into
crowds of funeral-goers. Such sequence of events called upon defection by violent means
among civilian organizations and local actors. The intersection of interests by local actors,
demonstrators and insurgents is derived from this event.
Damascus demonstrations began a bit later than in the other provinces. It’s unique
archaeology, demography, architecture, and institutional compositions create a pretext for
involvement in such efforts complicated. Participation in demonstrations as such would
likely compliment dire political/material grievances or an accessible opportunity structure
associated with participation in mobilized efforts. Let us thus begin by laying out the above
mentioned requisite structural components in the form of economic policy Damascus is the
oldest capital city in the world, boasts of rich human and religious heritage and is home to a
copious anthropological history, the likes of which are represented in the form of
architecture and designated according to their origins by their precise location in the city. In
the modern Syrian city, wealth is concentrated in the inner city.15 This is relevant in the case
and nature in of the cities and surrounding suburbs of Aleppo and Damascus, however,
recent trends in internal migration and the young, unemployed demographic have produced
an oversaturation of skilled labor at the suburban intersection of rural and explicitly urban
life. The ‘breakdown’ of neighboring Palestine and Lebanon produced a high surplus
15

UNHCR, “2014 Syria Regional Response Plan,” accessed, May 2, 2014, from:
www.unhcr.org.
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workforce, and the annexation by Israel of new borders has changed the nature of incentives
for local shadow economic actors. Rural areas, especially the southern and eastern outskirts
of Governates, have been the Fertile Crescent for rebel units and shadow-irregular forces, on
any and either side of the conflict, strategic use of violence against civilian populations in
order to deter cooperation with rebel military efforts and to stop annexation of political and
topographical physical discursive and conceptual space. Major instances of these events were
documented in Houla, Daraya, Banyas, and other cases.
Also ongoing as a trend among incumbent patrons is the use of foreign mercenaries,
and openly such as the case of Hama province and Hezbollah mercenaries or, speaking to the
former, in the eastern and southern provinces of Dera’a and Deirr El Zour, incumbent forces
have entangled local rebel efforts in a complex network of partisanship along the lines of
ethnic and/or religious identity. The regime employs in the major urban areas regular forces
including armored tanks and aerial bombardments. Degrees of regime investment in
particular geographical areas vary widely across a broad spectrum. The major productive
organs of regime capacity include taxation, foreign investment and trade, exports in
agriculture, finance employment and various service-based and industry-led employment in
the second-inner-most ring of the cities as they appear on maps. Regime violence and natural
resources, actors, trends, and typology of incumbent operations in oil-rich Deirr Ezzour,
fertile “crescent” al-Hassakeh, and questions of accessibility to trade routes for the transitory
securement of exports in raw agriculture and oil to the port cities and to the Turkish border.
Such begs the question of what the dynamics of the regime’s political clout coupled with
centralized monopolies over the state’s structural capacity for production as well as workers’

8

interests, moreover. These institutions share various and different types of entitlements,
wherein the central Ministry (in a given sector/service activity) maintained a centralized
cooperative-monopoly over the instruments of state power, including the ability to impose
sanctions (through embargoes, retraction of central subsidies, and the like).
The Damascus countryside, in terms of events, is the most equipped to shed light on
the connectivity between structural change and the micro-foundations of insurgent
mobilization. Present in Damascus are regional complexes16 affecting many sides to the
conflict in terms of currency, medical aid, weapons supplies, and political clout in NGOs as
well as IGOs. Damascus is a fruitful framework for assessing the impacts of preceding
conflicts in the region. Internally as well as regionally displaced cohorts of people are
present in Damascus Province including Palestinian refugees living in camps, Iraqi refugees
living in subsidized housing and in encampments, and internal migrants from the younger
generational cohort seeking specialization in career training, educational opportunities, and
employment. Damascus has been affected in the last decade by macro-level changes—in the
form of shifts in the overall employment structure in the province—as well as by localized
outcomes to the unique subset within the broader case because the war effort, on all sides of
the conflict and at many times in a multitude of locations, contains many case study models
in the topical framework of political violence. The trajectory of participation in Damascus
began with a domestic effort in mobilization before transitioning into a complex web of

16

Peter Wallensteen and M. Sollenberg, (1998) “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict
Complexes, 1989-97,” Journal of Peace Research 35:5, p. 631.
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various migrant groups—some newly arrived, others displaced since the Lebanese Civil War
and the 1967 June War with Israel—wherein Iraqi and Palestinian ex-patriots, refugees, and
mujahidin became intertwined in violent efforts to defeat government troops in Damascus
and the surrounding countryside. Participation in Damascus is one of the most difficult to
diagnose and interpret along the lines of identity. This allows room for understanding the
variation in allegiances among a given participating cohort, beginning in a peacetime setting
and transitioning into a conflict setting. The latter (conflict) period is not devoid of massive
ambiguities, as it stands in the present period of continued and protracted efforts.
Participation patterns often follow counter-intuitive outcomes. Many declared—and
implied—--allegiances to either side of the broad conflict, as well as between Syrian-born
revolution arise and the regime of Bashar al- Assad. The dynamics of political associations
are very complex in the case of Damascus; they are, in the post-2012 context. In the civilwar context, socio-political characterized by many combined social factors and inter-woven
with a socio-economic/ethno-religious space that is at once, personalized and cosmopolitan:
the former referring to the individual identity of the Muslim personage in contemporary
Damascus.
In the current context, the particulars of the collective action problem have, it goes
without saying, completely changed for insurgent and regime components, alike. Overall,
rebel efforts in Damascus carry simple incentive structure: the short and long-term goals are
the same among FSA legions and their civilian allies: the best case scenario and generalized
goal is to topple the regime and seize the state. (Note, such is not the long-term goal in the
case of Homs).

10

Rebel territorial victory is incomplete so long as Damascus stays intact. A successful
campaign, one in which rebels declare victory, requires sacking of government officials, state
institutions and regime controlled economic enterprises. In the short term, the tactics of
attrition and guerrilla warfare make a great deal of sense in a framework where an essential
factor affecting armed efforts by FSA in Damascus is the brandishing of improvised explosive
devices which lead to high numbers of collateral-civilian death at the hands of the rebels.
Access to the national military’s equipment/supplies is an indication that rebel forces have
already weakened 4th Division and Air Force Generals. This is true because of the
infrastructural elements of Damascus as it functions at war: the regime understands the high
stakes associated with any losses to territory in the center of the province. The regime will
maintain a partition over the entire Province for as long as it can weaken rebel guerrillas. In
the present period, regime forces have yet to lose the upper hand whereby the generals in the
national air force stay alive—and—so long as the instruments of a sustained air bombardment
remain at any degree, at some form of functional capacity. Thus, insurgent military victory
means dismantling air bases and military airports as these are the instruments of power
affecting collective action, most apparently. So, it is presumed that among insurgents—and in
terms of incentives in the war context—that the ultimate political and military prize is,
respectively, a two-sided sequence of events: dismantling incumbent airpower, killing Air
Force Generals, and seizure of the instruments of violence in the form of jets, helicopters, and
bombers.
Participation on the incumbent side is complex as well, containing elements of foreign,
national armies acting as irregular forces in the form of mercenaries, Iranian Revolutionary
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Guard being the most obvious example. Many variables which shed light on questions of
escalation, duration, and containment in a civil war conflict are at contained in the case of
Damascus. These will be extracted from timelines of events, below. At this case study
juncture, it is noteworthy to mention which exogenous factors, or, antecedent conditions have
already been enunciated: internal/ trans-national migration, employment, and
literacy/education.
May 10, 2012: Suicide bomb attacks kill more than fifty people near a police
base in Damascus.
July 18, 2012: An explosion at the National Security Building in Damascus kills
three top regime officials: Deputy Defense Minister Assef Shawkat (1950-2012),
Bashar Al-Assad’s brother-in-law and a former intelligence chief; Defense
Minister Daoud Rajha (1947-2012); and General Hassan Turkmani (19352012), a former defense minister; Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Brigade
group issue separate claims of responsibility.
25August 26, 2012: Security forces reportedly kill some 400 people in the
Damascus suburb of Daraya.
February 21, 2013: A car bombing near the ruling Baath Party headquarters in
Damascus kills more than fifty people.
March 25, 2013: Rebels fire mortars into central Damascus. May 5, 2013: Israel
says its military aircraft bombed a shipment of advanced surface- to-surface
missiles in Damascus possibly intended for Hezbollah.
August 21, 2013: Starting at 2:30 a.m., thousands of social media messages
report a chemical attack on Damascus suburbs; Western media publish images
of bodies of purported victims; opposition accuses Al-Assad regime of toxic gas
12

attack; Syrian Information Minister Omran Al-Zoubi says allegations are
“untrue and completely fabricated.”
August 30, 2013: White House accuses Syrian government of launching a
chemical attack that killed 1,429 people in the Damascus suburbs on August 21;
U.S. assessment says motive was to rid suburbs of opposition forces using area
to stage attacks on the capital; Doctors Without Borders later reports that three
hospitals near Damascus treated3, 600 patients displaying neurotoxic symptoms,
and that 355 of the patients were subsequently pronounced dead.17
Rebels launched an extravagant offensive in Eastern Ghouta in December 2013. In the
aftermath of their incursion they claimed to kill approximately 800 regime soldiers. The
Battle of Eastern Ghouta18 involved regime regular and irregular forces and united factions
brandished under the title: The Islamic Front. This event was a turning point in the war,
overall, because it represented the beginning of the factionalization of insurgent and
incumbent forces. Eastern Ghouta was a loss for FSA. The sophisticated communications
systems, material support, and tactical maneuvering coordinated carefully by a central
command in the Ghouta neighborhood. When regime airpower wiped out the
communications centers in Ghouta, the transition from irregular violence to guerrilla
violence among insurgents became commonplace in the broader Damascus Province.
The trajectory of events which represent tipping points19 in the total war thus far, are:
repression by regime instruments of violence, defection from within regular forces, the
17

Plofchan, T., (2014), "TIMELINE: SYRIAN CIVIL WAR." The Cairo Review of Global
Affairs, The American University in Cairo.
18
El-Sodar News (Arabic language), The Battle of Eastern Ghouta,
www.almasdarnews.com/maps/syria, (September 2014), accessed, October 31, 2014.
19
Collier, P., Sambanis N., chapter 5: “Understanding Civil War” Sporadic Ethnic Violence:
Why has Kenya not Experienced a Full Blown Civil War? pp. 125-129.
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brandishing of rebel forces under the enigmatic taxonomy: FSA (Free Syrian Army), rebel
territorial gains in Homs’ suburbs, Eastern Aleppo, Eastern Damascus, and various remote
areas, massive insurgent losses by Assad’s air campaign in suburban Aleppo, Hama and
Homs, the rise of factions, stalemate, and lastly, partitioning of Aleppo and Damascus
Provinces. Unique to the most durable of civil war conflicts is continued efforts by
incumbents whose tactical blue-book now follows the pedigree of attrition war, actualized
through guerrilla campaigns. This is true among FSA loyalists and commandeers as well as
among foreign mercenaries who are loosely interwoven under the informal-institutional
banner: The Islamic Front.
Factions among rebel forces coincided with the rise of factions among regime forces,
as well.20 Opportunistic rebels21are those brigades which seek to conquer the region (ISIL)
and have been brandished with the power to create new institutions, namely through piracy
and in the form of cartels, sustained through illegal oil trade and the instrumentalization22 of
coercive violence and the strategy of using civilians and journalists as bargaining chips. This
is underscored by specific patterns of ISIL/foreign fighting elements whose relevant politics
which justify their efforts are limited to a mutual hatred of the Assad regime and most
importantly, those Ba’athist principles of socialist governance which, as far as they
understand, were responsible for the dismantling of Iraq since the late 1980s and ending with
an internally broken structural amalgam. Many Islamists from Iraq who fought American

20

Staniland, P., “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and
the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56: (1): pp. 16-40.
21
Benetech Reports, ibid. Index 2.1
22
Gutierrez, Sanin, F., (2014), “Ideology and Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond,”
Journal of Peace Research, IEPRI-Universidad Nacional de Colombia vol. 51, (2) 213-226.
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combatants in Iraq and who the American military’s shock and awe strategy rendered Iraq
hopeless in terms of reconcilability in the post-Iraq War period. Many former rank and file
troops from Saddam Hussein’s military were put in jail by American joint operatives
following the spectacular trial and hanging of Saddam Hussein. Since being released, many
have joined the ranks of Islamist rebel groups, seeking revenge against Iranian mercenaries.
These ambiguous partcipants are present on all sides of the conflict, and are represented by
mercenaries from all over the region and among Iraqi diaspora in the case of Islamist
insurgents. Among incumbent loyalists, these include the Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen
and Hizballah mercenaries.23 Insurgent forces allegiant to ISIL/ISIS goals and strategic
appropriations are as complex and ambiguous as perhaps, FARC guerrillas in Columbia
whereby their allegiance is dependent upon intimately derived incentives: revenge, jihad, and
the seizure of power in Syria and ultimately, the total region. In terms of instrumental
violence, these peripheral components in the insurgency can be identified by the kidnapping
of UN Peace-keepers, the extra-judicial killing of American and French journalists, and the
targeting of civilian populations in Eastern Ghouta and Jobar, Damascus.
The Ghouta Joint operation room of Ahrah Al-Sham, Nusra, Habib Mostapha,
Shabab AlHoda, Katibat Issa ibn Mariam. The room was created back in June.
The guy making the battle video announcement appears in a Youtube video
announcing the creation of this room, Jaysh al Islam (Army of Islam). The
Islamic Union of Sham Soldiers. Announced Nov 30, the coalition included
Shabab al Hoda, Habibi Mostapha, Amjad al Islam, AlSahaba, Dirii al Asima.

23

Al-Monitor, (June 2, 2013) “Why Hizballah is Fighting in Syria,” accessed, January 14, 2014,
from: www.almonitor.com.
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This was part of the broader “Rif Dimashq Offensive” begun in November, 2012
and was when the Eastern front of rebel fighters attempting to liberate the city
from the countryside penetrated checkpoints and controlled supply routes.24
By December of 2013, rebel positions in Eastern Ghouta were defeated by regime air
power. The loss of the Tawhid Brigade Commander in Idlib25, near the countryside was
equally devastating for joint operations in various remote areas. The regime defected
wholesale in not knowing what the foreign elements of insurgents meant in terms of violent
capacity, hence the regime erred on the side of terror, as well. Perhaps the most famous of
such high stakes defection by asymmetrically informed regime operatives is the wielding of
chemical weapons in the southern Damascus countryside. This gesture was centrally derived
by regime officials and designed in such a way that it would beckon international military
and/or diplomatic intervention, in the capital of Damascus. Naturally, these outcomes were
animated by a fearful and weakened Assad regime and with the belief that a successful
guerrilla campaign could be imminent.26 A report by UN weapons inspectors found “clear and
compelling evidence that surface-to-surface missiles containing the nerve agent sarin were
launched from regime-controlled positions on Ein Tarma, Moadamiyah, and Zamalka in the
Ghouta neighborhood of Damascus.27 Officials from the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) arrived in Damascus to monitor the dismantling of Syria’s
chemical weapons arsenal soon after the second alleged incidence of regular forces’ use of

24

Landis, J., (2013) Blog Entry, accessed June 2, 2013, from: www.joshualandis.com, “Syria
Comment.”
25
Landis, J., (2013) ibid.
26
The Guardian, “Timeline of Major Events” Syria, War Reports, accessed February 8, 2013.
27
ibid. www.theguardian.com (2013).
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sarin gasin the context of escalated efforts by insurgents in Eastern Damascus, Idlib, and
Aleppo, at once.28 Annexed rebel territory and insurgent positions were at the peak of their
territorial gains when they reached as far eastern as Qataiba and included the neighborhoods of
Harran al Awamid, Qaysa, Abadeh, Jarba, and Douma (in the northwest of Damascene
countryside) as ‘liberated’ territory. Still held by the regime by November 2012 were the
military airport, Adra, the Damascus international Airport (used by commercial jets until late
in 2012 when Damascus was experiencing fierce clashes) and the Sahya Mountains Military
Base. The neighborhoods of Harasta, Irbin and Ghouta, held by insurgents and allies, were
strategic gold mines, their geography created a de-facto buffer between regime forces and
rebel infrastructural depots in the form of telecommunications and equipment for an attrition
war. Also uniquely privileged among rebels was the ability to surprise regime checkpoints
from a distance and through building trenches and spectacularly attacking regime checkpoints
without a second’s notice.
By January of 2014, a partition of the city remained intact, splitting the Northeast and
Southeastern boundaries of Damascus through the Yarmouk refugee camp, located directly
north of Sayyidah Daynab and the military road connecting the center of Damascus to the
Damascus international airport. North of Yarmouk are the regime’s military strongholds in the
neighborhoods of Midan and Jaramana. East of Jaramana is Ghouta, the front of the preceding
rebel assault on regime bases. Yarmouk refugees were choked off from supply routes to the
west (regime) and the east (rebel territory) and food, medical supplies, and potable water could
not could not penetrate either rebel or regime lines of partition. Now that the key events and

28

OPCW, Statement on Syria Investigation (2013), all.
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their relevant frameworks have been identified according to their origins, stated and implicit
military and political (long-term) goals.
At this point, we have derived the research variable/independent variable: violence.
This independent variable must be disaggregated as regime violence versus insurgent violence,
in such form it will then be possible to derive a relationship between certain types of civil war
violence and a multitude of nominal-causal (independent) variables. From here, the final task
of re-aggregating these same variables in order to determine a) whether there exist any
covariant relationship between civil war violence (any given type) and state capacity b) to
what extent such covariance exists.
Prior to the internet age, it was difficult to even gain access to—let alone understand
along pseudo-scientific boundaries—the identities of displaced peoples and or refugees in
Damascus and across the region, naturally. Given, however, the rise of social media and the—
albeit relative—degree of anonymity afforded by such mediums of communication, such
social phenomena like twitter and Facebook have become the lenses through which the
intersection of individual and group attitudes toward a given phenomenon in the social world,
interact safely and in a manner that travels faster than all other forms of communication. More
importantly, those persons who are documented as refugees/temporarily displaced asylum
seekers, and the like but are stateless, are identifiable as a result of social media and networking
in digital space, broadly. Moreover the interaction of a given in-group in the context of radical
experiments in social media and disclosure, coupled with the nature of regime weak points as
we understand them in the Syrian context, are the pretexts within which media communication
via the internet translates into physical mobilization with political demands and goals in mind.
One could say that the Province of Aleppo is the epicenter of antique and pre-antiquity
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religious heritage. Moreover, Aleppo is the host and hub of all economic activity, operating as
the epicenter of oscillation between market forces, individuals, and monetary exchange. This
can be said for both domestic actors, and between compatriots, and foreign actors, in the form
of international investment, agreement and contract negotiations between developers and/or
trading legions, and domestic producers and merchants in the intermediary position, succinctly.
If such is true about Aleppo, in as few words as possible, then, Damascus Province is the capital
of Arab cultural heritage and material power in the form of respectively, heritage sites,
preserved architecture, national monuments, and those institutions which contain the
instruments of the preservation of such national monuments, alike.
Idlib Province

The Province of Idlib has been involved in war related engagements throughout a lengthy
period since onset of hostilities. Clashes between regime officials and insurgent groups in the
province can be characterized as mobile. Idlib lies in the northwestern quadrant of the country,
sharing a border with Turkey to the north and the Province of Homs to the south and lies
adjacent to the northwestern border of Aleppo. By the month of February, the Syrian Martyrs
Database recorded 10,156 war related deaths in the province, including both civilian and military
deaths, as well as deaths of prisoners. Idlib maintained a single Coordinating Committee
beginning in the pre-war period in April of 2011. Local Coordinating Committees eventually
take on an important intermediary role—connecting guerilla efforts with the short and long-term
goals of non-combatants.
In Idlib, the Local Coordinating Committee has used its banner to collect information on
individual deaths document them with detail. The Idlib LCC indicates a dissipation in
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coordinated efforts by the group, however the extent of the group’s activity after the months of
December and January, 2012, is difficult to further diagnose according to extent and/or degree,
given the selective appropriations of electricity in rebel territories by regime officials wherein
powerful agents of the state’s private sector used electricity and subsequent broadband and cell
phone monopolies (Syriatel) as an instrument of war whereby authorities seeking to diffuse any
accessible (by foreign journalists and humanitarian NGOs, alike) centralized coordination along
revolutionary lines. By simply blacking out the electrical grid, state agents were able to erase
many narratives available to Internet users, exclusively, affording the regime an upper hand in
tactical organization in limited timeframes, as well.
The Idlib Martyrs Brigade: Formerly called the Syrian Liberation Army, were never a
unit of larger defectors and are at odds with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), less equipped in terms
of weaponry but better supported by local actors. Spokesman of the Brigade is Haitham
Qutheimati, was outspoken in refusal to participate in Kofi Annan’s cease-fire operation and
subsequent negotiation sessions, claiming that any SLA compliance with a cease fire meant that
the brigadiers only temporarily ran out of weapons. On November 5, 2012, brigade commander
Bassil Ayeesa and rebels were killed in an airstrike. Also, the Idlib Military Council was the
umbrella group under which guerilla fighters planned operations and retrieved material support
from supply routes to the north.
By February 2014, another coalition of rebel forces in Idlib coalesced under the name
Jaysh al- Sham (Army of the Levant) which also included the Syrian Martyrs Brigade (badly
weakened by air bombardments). Idlib is overwhelmingly rural, it shares a border with Turkey to
the North/north- west, remote areas are in the eastern part of the province. The province is made
mostly of fertile low-lying land conducive to large scale industrial agriculture. Major sources of
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GDP from agriculture are native to Idlib. Cash crops such as olives, wheat and cotton originate
within Idlib’s large agricultural plots and are a source of domestic GDP from raw goods.
Industry- textiles are the primary industrial project in Idlib beginning in the Mandate period.
Citrus and olive plantations line the outskirts of the province and are a major source of domestic
revenue. The urban/suburban city “center” of the Governate is called Ashrifiyeh,29 low skilled
laborers who work in soap manufacturing and textiles. Wheat and cotton are the most important
crops in Idlib, food prices in Syria are largely determined by Idlib’s crop yields from wheat. Idlib
rests at the southwestern border of Turkey and is mostly populated by Arabs in the form of
communities of subsistent farmers. The native population in Idlib are agrarian30 and relatively
poor.31 Large majority of peoples are Sunni Arabs, with small pockets of Christian Arabs in the
northwestern, mountainous region as well as in the main quarter of the city. Large-scale farming
and textile manufacturing are the primary sources of income for Idlib and employment largely
falls into these spheres of activity or at least to some derivative of them. The north and northwestern terrain of Idlib is hilly and more densely wooded, the climate becomes more desert-like
the further east in the province.
The Province of Idlib was the first to be lost from the regime and declared a liberated
Governate by the local Coordinating Committee. Local fighters banned together as brigades
often as members of the same family or extended families sharing a tactical upper hand by
knowledge of the territory as well as a pre-war attitude of local inter-subjective loyalty and tribal
autonomy which, by the war’s onset, translated into a formal doctrine of preservation. Second,
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non-combatant/civilian allegiance required little coercion from insurgents. Largely agricultural,
the residents of Idlib shared the incentives of rebel fighters, many of whom were native to the
Province of Idlib. These factors in tandem contributed to Idlib’s resilient insurgency.
The regime’s structural withdrawal from the remote areas via restructuring left a
vacuum in the actor-institution arrangement that had characterized the preceding period. Hence,
prior to following the rubric of liberalization and decentralization, the regime was privileged
with many enforcement mechanisms that preserved central authority and the regime’s
monopoly over strategic violence. The particular conditions which were at work during the prewar phase to onset are derived below in the form of a Truth Table.
The presence of a state-appointed subsidiary in each sect of the economy entrusted
more responsibility with diffuse regime components. This is unlike the structure of the military,
whose operations begin and end with an elite authority in the Syrian Air Force. Most important
to note is the linkage between agriculture as industry—the first public enterprise to fall out of the
formal nexus of the state and into the liberal paradigm—represents the first participants in the
rebellion, i.e., as members of the agrarian socio-economic in-group. In the Idlib Province
foreign developers and their employees suspended operations early on in the war even prior to
the escalation in Homs. This left an equilibrium of incentives that largely favored the
insurgency as it meant access to public goods including localized political autonomy as well as
protection for the local peoples and their lands. Moreover, the geography of Idlib was favorable
to rebels, it’s northwestern location meant easily accessible border crossing into Turkish territory
for those seeking sanctuary, combatants and non- combatants alike.
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In order to diagnose the combined factors which contributed to onset and escalation of violent
conflict all possible causal variables. These are considered in the Syrian case based on extant
research in the field and through existing case studies.32 The durability of a given insurgency
in a civil war depends on the nature of allegiances among non-combatants. Networks of
civilian support and the extent of their allegiance can make or break insurgent capacity. To this
extent, the table below measures the degree of anti-regime grievances.33
Table 1 Truth Table, Onset (1=present, 0=absent)
Province

Coordinating Refugees/diaspora High internally Large rural population
Committee groups
displaced

Damascus 1

1

1

1

Aleppo

1

1

1

1

Homs

1

1

0

1

Hama

1

1

0

1

Deraa

1

1

0

1

Deir ElZorr 1

1

0

1

Idlib

1

0

1

1

Provinces that contain most of or all of the categories predicting favorability at the
onset of the war, moreover, contain the most sophisticated insurgent efforts. Also unique is
the question of ideology and coercive violence: regime held areas boast of air tight
ideological monopolies by Assad, indicated by the regime’s use of low-level violence,
designed in such a manner so as to maximally deter defections by civilian enclaves.
32
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The nature and composition of rebel units operating in the province of Homs was the
first of its kind. The geography of regime and rebel campaigns is unique because fighting was
centered mainly in the urban districts with the heaviest concentration of battle related deaths
located in neighborhoods closest to the city’s center. The second unique characteristic of
Homs civil war efforts are the pedigree of rebel fighters in the province as originating within
the national military, Homs internal conflict was almost exclusively, early on—between
defectors from the regular army and the national army, itself. Third, the tactical arrangement
of rebel efforts are unique as a product of the first two characteristics: rebel strategy—largely
orthodox in nature— involved capturing and holding territory, opposite the war of maneuver
that rebels in surrounding provinces were carrying out.
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Rebel Incentives
After independence34 Syria underwent a brief unification period with Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s Egypt whereby Syrian national institutional, military, and economic sovereignty was
under the diffuse supervision of Egypt’s Vice President. This ambitious pan-Arab project was
formally disbanded in 1961 with a nationalist coup and subsequent transitional period of, once
again, an autonomous platform of singular and autonomous central leadership. The withdrawal
of Syria from the UAR ushered in a period of reforms to Syrian partisan power-sharing. The
balance tipped in the favor of the Ba’ath Party, given Ba’athist reputability as the anti-UAR
domestic party, rejecting the experiment of institutional and nationalist integration in favor of as
strong domestic partnership and co-federation between the two countries. By the mid-1960s,
Syria’s most formidable political clout was concentrated in the hands of the Ba’ath Party
leadership, bridging economic, military, and coercive power through the Absolutist governance
of the Ba’ath.
This pre-requisite characteristic of Absolutism is paramount in the grievances among
local coordinating committees across Syria. Early on in the mobilization of a non-violent
resistance, the rhetoric associated with a constituency prepared to mobilize began during the
Damascus Spring and bled into the demands of the LCCs. The signatures of the ‘99’35 was a
document signed by Syrian nationals from elite institutions. The title of this civil convergence
most often invoked is: The Damascus Spring. Briefly, the conference litigation and issuance of
34
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demands by these concerned elites were meant to reflect the goals of a peaceful organization
across civil society. Signatories to the document thus ended up calling for the implementation of
reforms to the political system.
The Damascus Spring was a forecasting of the adherent costs associated with this
particular type of developing-state government and the economic liberalization associated with
the broad paradigm of globalization. Damascus Spring patrons were confident in the new
president’s capacity to acknowledge the gaps in policy reform whereby Syria’s
political/legal/juridical nexus moved backward in time while the macro and micro-economic
structures slipped into the future. The meeting called for a reconfiguration of and top-down
reform to the system of governance, demanding free and fair elections, an end to repression,
checks and balances, judicial oversight, an end to the Emergency Laws (in place for four
decades), and the like. These phenomena served to supplement an already rigorous vacuum of
political leadership in the form of central interior departments, organized in a top-down bureaucratic
framework, wherein the absolutism of political representation was essentially bound to the minority
status afforded such leadership: respectively, these categories are understood in political terms: in the
form of the Ba’ath Party and as they operate in an in-group framework: as ethnic and religious
Alawites with minority status in Syria’s broader western region.36
Due to the weakened status of post-war-for-liberation -Syria, central authority was diffuse
and brokered by many parties and representative bodies, under the brief union between Egypt
and Syria the monopoly over material instruments of power could not remain integral in the
context of nationalist reputational capital among Communists and pan-regionalists, broadly.
36
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Those institutions which remained accessible in fortified, clandestine space and negotiating
settings took place in the context of military structural power and between agents of a
reformed Ba’ath party leadership, thus culminating in the famous marriage of the elite Fourth
Military Division under Rifa’at al-Assad and Hafez al-Assad, in tandem and through a swift
military coup. This nexus of concentratedpower would evolve to include the now infamous
Syrian Air Force and the Department of the Interior, two clandestine fortifications located in
the western corridors of the Old City of Damascus. Ba’athists in Syria and their patrons in
various domestic sectors capitalized skillfully on the rhetoric associated with a given absolutist
regime. Highlighting the existential consequences of losing the status quo, in the form of complete
monopolies, in either the 4th Division,37 the Air Force, the Presidential Guard, the presidency itself
or a combination, historians and commentators on Syria’s conflict and time-line of events
highlight the “blood” ties of the regime whereby a defeat over the monopoly by, it is often
invoked, the ethno-religious “sect” known as Alawites who are, notably, of the minority Shia
Muslim faction and whose minority status lends credence to the current declarative certainty
among various outlets in the media and among historians, that the in-group, ethno-religious
identity of a given partisan to the conflict, is the singular causal determinate which affects the
behavior and governing dynamics of that same partisan, as an individual or in the context of ingroup/out-group dualism.
At a glance, the complexity of ethnic defection38 in any case is such that it demands
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careful attention to detail. In Syria’s case, ethnic defections took the form of Alawites targeting
one another through seizure of assets at checkpoints in the provinces of Lattakia and Tartous,
alike. It is yet to be the case that a given guerrilla unit target non-combatant Alawites in the
mountainous areas based on their ethnic-kinship, alone. Those absolute sums which entail the
losing side being slaughtered wholesale via a genocide or ethnic cleansing in the immediate
aftermath of one side’s victory, this is not a likely scenario in Syria’s case. Such an overdetermination of outcome is likewise an inaccurate over-aggregation of strategic military
commitments, tactical arrangements, deterministic identity and political free will. In Syria’s
case, these contradictory associations are quite opposite: Syria is overwhelmingly an ethnic Arab
state with the majority of the population tracing back to Bedouin origins with pockets of
Turkmen, central-European, central-Asian, Alawite, Kurdish, Circassian, Sephardic, and
Armenian communities who, say in the case of Kurds, have been in northern Syria since the rule
by Ottoman Empire. Syria’s status as a central trade hub for Byzantine, Ottoman and (most
recently) Indo-European market activity has greatly complicated the anthropological history of
its inhabitants.39
Anti-regime mobilization—and the deaths which are related to it—are cited in the Syrian
Martyrs Database40 beginning in March, 2011 when the Days of Rage called upon Syrians to
demand that the regime relinquish power. Exogenous factors are those which contributed to
either the direct or indirect identification with the revolution as a civilian/non-combatant and/or
supporter of mobilized resistance. The identification (along political lines related to goal-setting)
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as a contributor to some degree to revolutionary efforts during the period of non-violent
mobilization by civilian agents overlaps with the stated goals of coordinating committees. This
remains true throughout the period of onset. The following factors contributed to the onset of
hostilities in Syria’s case:
1) High unemployment and/or joblessness among native Homs is, internal migrants and
refugees/internationally displaced communities, alike. The combination of a highly skilled
workforce along supply routes has contributed to the partition of the Governate along geographic
lines: City and countryside (suburbs), wherein highly skilled labor was among elite factions of
minority demographics in the center of the city and rebel campaigns continued to thrive in the
eastern and western surrounding areas where rebel identification was lent credence by economic
reform and the socio-economic outcomes of survival favored continued mobilization in the form
of attrition campaigns.
2) The presence of at least one permanently displaced minority in the form of asylum
seekers included Sunnis who left Hama during the 1982 massacre. These are politically relevant
actors who benefit from the failure of the regime because it would entail the return of land and
property, lost first under the Egyptian annexation then, by regime officials who either jailed or
confiscated wealthy land-owning elites. These incentives and partisan complications contributed
to a similar partition in the case of Damascus, where refugees in the Yarmouk Camp provided
political and ethnic clout to the regime wherein the starvation of Palestinians created breathing
room for Assad’s regime, wherein asking questions about Syria’s civil rights and humanitarian
abuses tied the hands of international networks and non-governmental agencies who would first
have to acknowledge Palestinian statelessness. The blockade and partition through Yarmouk
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forced residents of the camp to pick a side, proverbially, which they failed to do, sealing their
fate as neither enemies to the regime nor enemies to rebel FSA forces and as stateless persons
from Pales- tine awaiting the Right of Return.
3) Contraction of central subsidy allocations for agriculture in the Homs countryside, in
other words: austerity. Through shifts to state policy, the perceived capacity of the state by the
broad agrarian community offset the cost associated with resistance. The regime’s loss of social
capital supplemented the regime’s loss of material capacity which resulted from the policy
changes mentioned above.
Many sources for descriptive statistics have been made available by a handful of NGOs,
religious syndicates, non- profits, state representatives, and IGOs as well as native epistemic
groups, alike. One such group is the Syrian Martyrs Database, which began operating in Syria
and publishing their results abroad with professional diaspora in Turkey. They and other likeminded groups have provided the public with aggregate data on war related deaths. According to
these data sets, the highest frequency of war- related deaths in Homs occurred during the
calendar years of 2012 and 2013, specifically during the month of February of 2012. A spike41 in
documented killings in Homs occurred in August of 2012 and continued to rise into the fourhundreds through November of 2012.42 In the month of February of 2013, Homs peaked in
numbers of war- related deaths.
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Restructuring in Agriculture
The economic viability of many developing states can be determined by singular sectors
in the national economy, in Syria’s case, this is the agricultural sector. Furthermore, among
post-colonial states whose governments rely disproportionately or perhaps, exclusively, on
agricultural exports as the primary source of revenue, structural adjustments can make or break a
given state’s material capacity. Syria followed the China model for development, an
ideological rubric for modernization wherein liberal economic policy would beget reforms
to the political system. Policy changes in the formal economy in Syria began to mimic the
basic tenants of liberalization in the 1980s decade, beginning with gradual reforms to the
agricultural sector. By the mid-1990s, Syria’s Cooperative Agricultural Bank had overseen and
implemented a series of economic adjustments aimed at liberalizing Syrian agriculture.43 In
policy terms, this translated into an overhaul to the cooperative model in exchange for gradual
privatization. Changes to agriculture began with the introduction of demand-side planning and
the introduction of subsidized strategic crops.44 These include chickpeas, tobacco, barley, lentil,
wheat, and sugar beet.
The leasing and tenure of arable land had for at least fifteen years (under the Agricultural
Relations Law45 of 1958), been a domestic enterprise owned and operated by middle-class
merchants from the cities of the Aleppo and Damascus Governates. A stable disincentive system
barring access to domestic agrarian markets by manufacturer import ventures was achieved
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through the imposition of an important source of revenue that adjusted according to inflation on
an annual basis: tariffs, duties, and fees on foreign imports.
Through these supply-side subsidies, the costs of tenant, landlord, and oversight housing,
services, and equipment were kept relatively safe. Also, as has been demonstrated above, the
diffuse apparatus of state-run institutions for the distribution of domestic goods and foodstuffs
related to agriculture were likewise—safe from externalities and exogenous changes. Finally,
tenant laborers on agricultural plots were protected through a Federation and national Union.
What suffered most during the 1970s was irrigation systems and maintenance of land as a result
of local difficulties. The cooperative reform-within- the-reform assisted in guaranteeing that
farmers received their full subsidies in the form of wages, maintenance, and diesel fuel for
irrigation systems.
In 198746 the Cooperative Agricultural Bank of Syria began implementing a restructuring
plan. This allowed the central, administrative functions of supply-side subsidization to be
transitioned from state hands to that of the Agricultural Input Marketing Organization (AIMO),
a private, foreign subsidiary firm who today, remains the only oversight to imports, exports,
distribution, pricing, and subsidies in Syria’s agricultural sector.47 The details of the 1987 reform
included a final overhaul to change the function and responsibility of the Agricultural
Cooperative Bank from its previous function (central planning, distribution, price fixation,
subsidization, etc.), now officially in private hands, to a complete opposite operational function:
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as a trusteeship and financial advisory board whose singular responsibility became financial
innature; that is, to oversee that accessibility was not barred by any of the central planning,
protection, price fixing, and taxation by government administrators and institutions. This total
reversal of roles between the Agricultural Cooperative Bank and the AIMO had serious
consequences in Syria’s transition into the twenty-first century. The graphic below shows the
evolution of agriculture from the year 1993 until 2009 as a percentage of overall GDP according
to “value added” over time. This is the structural back-drop which makes clear, the social setting
within agrarian communities in Syria prior to such structure-agent dynamics transitioned into an
internal war.
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Agriculture (value added) as percentage of overall GDP
By the mid-1990s, Syria’s Cooperative Agricultural Bank had overseen and implemented
a series of economic adjustments aimed at liberalizing Syrian agriculture.48 In policy terms, this
translated into an overhaul to the cooperative model in exchange for gradual privatization.

48

FIRDOS (2004) “Country Statistics, Syria,” www.firdos.org, ibid.
33

Changes to agriculture began with the introduction of demand-side planning and the introduction
of subsidized “strategic crops.”49 These included chickpeas, tobacco, barley, lentil, wheat, and
sugar beet.
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Savings as Percentage of Overall GDP 1980-1999 (World Bank)
The remote, agrarian50 regions that no longer fell under the “modern” doctrine of private
competition, were ignored for at least twenty years, prior to which they were afforded subsidies,
machinery, fertilizers, irrigation systems, and diesel, e.g., what was included in the first period of
agriculture.51 Over the course of ten years, beginning in the early, to mid-1990s decade and
ending in the early, to-mid-2000s, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
completed a series of projects in Syria’s rural communities, equipped with massive funding and
earmarks for particular projects in particular areas. These were the areas that were, as has already
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been explained in detail, encumbered by poverty as a result of decades-long structural
adjustments to the agricultural sector. To recap, restructuring included the privatization of Syria’s
exports and adjustments to the socialist doctrine of central planning, whereby in less than twenty
years, agriculture went from a system of planned resources for domestic consumption i.e., as a
source of revenue, rural, and urban employment, the latter of which was achieved through state
industry with the purpose of manufacturing and distributingagricultural machinery, equipment,
accessories, supplies, and the like. These policy changes began in 1987 with an overhaul to the
previous period’s macro-economic structure, changing the composition of supply-side policy, thus
retrofitting the nature of price fixation (according to yields) and costs (of machinery imported
previously from the Soviet Union in a mutually beneficial trade agreement) completely. Factors
such as worker productivity and arability of the land certainly co-varied with these rigid policy
changes, including the presence of drought, explicitly.52
In the year 2003, a rural development firm called the “Aga Khan Foundation53” became
the surrogate to economic activity in the rural areas. To this extent Aga Khan Foundation,
through “recognizing the link between poverty and the lack of resource endowments,54”adopted
the practical enterprise of implementing reforms through training local actors by teaching local
actors the nature of modern of agriculture. This was carried out through the disbursement of
private loans, expensive classes, and hands-on tutorials with AKF experts. These loans were
distributed by and subsidized through co-funding with another subsidiary groups of lenders called
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the “First Microfinance Institution” or FMI, a partner to the AGF in its Salamiyah project.55 The
Aga Khan Foundation also conducted reforms in the realm of finance. Through their subsidiary
firm—called the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance (AKAM)56— their function job was to
introduce the establishment of lending through the distribution of credit. AKAM had operations
in the district of Al Haffeh in rural Idlib. AKAM also had business advisory boards in Masyaf,
(Aleppo), Jobar (Damascus) and Suwewaydeh (Eastern Deraa). Their loan packages ranged from
$60 (US) to $3,000 US dollars. AKAM established offices in these areas in the year 2005.
The Fund for Integrated Rural Development in Syria (FIRDOS) was established in 2001
under the “Syria Trust for Development”57 is a non-profit organization whose stated mission is58
“enhancing the bottom-up approach that aims to strengthen and enable the local community to
become capable of taking the lead in the development process.”59 They are of course, endogenous
to the “development” paradigm and operate in Syria’s poorest villages in the countryside.
FIRDOS is accredited by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Aga Khan
have projects in Marah (Damascus countryside) Ebla& Kafer Jales (Idleb) and villages across the
Lattakia and Aleppo Provinces.60 FIRDOS also has a telecommunications branch among its
inventory of development organizations called the Mobile Information Centre (MIF) whose
oversight and planning fell under the auspice of the only national yet for-profit telecom company,
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Syriatel.
As mentioned in this section previously, Syrian agriculture has always occupied a
significant portion of total GDP; any negative changes to this crucial economic sector will be felt
in the form of discontent, much like the experience of Hama farmers beginning in the 1970s: the
dissident cohort of disenfranchised Syrians whose experience of personal anomie gave way to
the rise of Hama’s Muslim Brotherhood, which grew in popularity as state capacity slowly
but steadily retracted in certain industrial and agricultural productive forces.
The total cost of the International Fund for Agricultural Development’s Syrian projects
was the equivalent to $58.1 million US and was co-financed by OPEC’s Fund for International
Development. The latter contributed US $20.1 million.61 IFAD approved private loans to farmers
in Syria that in total averaged to be approximately US $20.1 million. IFAD’s progress report on
its Syrian projects, titled “Enabling Poor Rural People to Overcome Poverty in Syria” stated in
their report that the main causes of poverty in rural Syria included “lack of access to credit and
markets,” as well as the “lack of a suitable microfinance system responding to the needs of rural
people.”62 The development fund/charity is the functional equivalent of the landlords who
sought, to some extent to sabotage local productivity so as to hold onto their landed property
and slow the process of expropriation and break-up to various monopolies on arable land. So it
goes for the development organization as well; the farmers—instead of being sabotaged by local
officials under the auspices of the landed elites—were now at the mercy of private investors
whose identity is functionally akin to that of the landlord. The academic literature on civil wars
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includes the academic doctrine of “greed and grievance63” whereby scholarly partisans of the
“greed” cleavage reduce questions of rebel collective action to a rubric of behavioral calculability
along the positivistic lines of econometric social theory.64 This precedent has since been
modified by scholars who have introduced the category of “opportunistic”65 rebels or, to
be presently specific, insurgent groups that gain support and participation according to the
immediate bodily needs of civilian populations and according to the ideology of the amalgam
known as the Islamic State.
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Restructuring in Manufacturing, Employment, and Finance

Changes were made to non-agricultural sectors of the national economy as well. Beginning
in 1999, employment in jobs classified by the IMF as ‘finance and insurance’ increased by
forty percentage points as the overall source of employment in Syria’s employment. Syria
established an institution in 2001 called the Investment Office of the Supreme Investment
Council which was designed to procure foreign investment in the financial sector. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a lending subsidiary of the IMF, provided the
distribution of. A new source of private wealth in Syria that was likewise a product of the
privatization trend and a major change to employment in the financial sector was the
introduction of the private consulting firm.
The IMF established a Price Stabilization Fund for Syria66 in the year 2000, the likes
of which was designed to restructure the government’s sources of revenue and expenditure
through a series of private sector investments. In 2001 there was an 85% increase to natural
gas extraction by private developers Syria’s natural gas fields are located in the Dierr Ezzor
Province which is also the location of much of Syria’s proven oil reserves. In 2002,
however, there was only a 54% increase; production came to a sudden halt until and—in
2004—Dierr Ezzor was abandoned when it was contracted to a Saudi Arabian developer who
converted a project into a power plant.
According the IMF’s descriptive statistics, domestic consumption of natural gas
decreased in the 2001-2002 timeframe; this is indicative of the fact that none of the output
from gas extraction was used for domestic purposes.
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By 2003, public enterprises including manufacturing, housing, electricity, water, and
gas had their subsidies at least halved over a period of three years. Let us then look more
closely at how particular areas of Syria’s urban economy, were monetarily reformatted
according to the rubric of liberalization. That is, let us unpack the Price Stabilization Fund’s
activity in the areas of textiles, crude oil refinement, and construction/agricultural machinery
and storage.67
In the 1970s and 1980s, the city of Homs was among the most dependent on the
regime for employment namely in the industry of petroleum-related work.68 Construction69 and
manufacturing in chemical fertilizers70 employed a majority of Homs’ low-skilled and industrial
workforce. Industrial workers had previously been incorporated under the General Federation
of Workers’ Unions from the beginning of the regime. Roughly three fourths of the male
work force was employed in the petroleum industry in the 1970s decade.71 Homs has a large
concentration of skilled laborers who were employed as industrial managers and engineers.72
Of these, a majority73 worked in the Homs Refinery complex, foreclosed upon officially in the
year 2003.
Employment in the Hama Province was based in three industries: petrochemicals,
textiles, and steel74 ( all of which were also incorporated under the General Federation of
Workers’ Unions). Hamah’s unemployment rate beginning in the 1980s reached upwards of 23%.
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State controlled ginning operations in Hamah, all of which were incorporate under the General
Organization for Textile Industries (UNITEX),75 were officially shut down in 2003. Deirr Ezzor
and al-Raqqa had employed much of their workforces in textiles as well, under the same Textile
Industries Federation which to date is not operational. In Banyas, employment was steadily cut
back beginning in the mid-1980s and was halved by 2003.76 Banyas is adjacent to Tartous, the
coastal city that experienced an “economic boom” (BBC Reports) in the year 2010. The refinery in
Banyas that was foreclosed upon in 2003 employed some of the highest skilled industrialchemical engineers in all of Syria.
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Conclusion
The broad components of the Syrian domestic economy were already unstable when the
American invasion of Iraq began.77 This, of course, resulted in the Syrian absorption of one and
a half million Iraqi refugees. This task—granting asylum to neighboring Iraqis 78—
took place within an already precarious social, political, and economic context, and meant that
Iraq’s internal crisis and the lack of reconcilable institution building at the outset of the Iraq
War—was yet another tipping point. In 2006, housing in the suburbs of Damascus was already
scarce and now was fully saturated resulting in high inflation in housing prices and a shortage of
renters with national identification paperwork.79 Further, Iraqis in Syria’s cities began competing
for employment, cultivating exogenous social cleavages into sources of political
grievance. 80
At this project’s conclusion, it is clear that the extent to which the regime was able to
implement effective instruments of coercion was greatly atrophied by changes in the structure of
the state’s economy. This is indicated by the failure of regime forces to effectively repress local
dissent in the transitional period. The durability of rebel efforts in the countryside have to do
with the nature of group-based grievances and the salience of revolutionary social identification.
The nature of the employment structure in the remote areas was such that the incentive to
protect fellow members of various agrarian populations was more salient among individuals in
the countryside. These stakeholders were connected through subsistence living or through
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lengthy familial lineages. The incentive to brandish protection for the community was
characterized by horizontal organization. This rings particularly true in Dera’a Province where
rebel factions mobilized early on and on the coattails of state repression. This was before the
civil war, it is worthy to note, but it is the pretext within which future factions and support
thereof, can be contextualized, that is, where exogenous structural components, in the form of a
breakdown in state capacity, aligned coherently with the individual and group identities of rebel
factions.
The pre-war phase of Syria’s history followed a (loosely) similar formula to that of
Egypt at the beginning of the Arab Spring. Both cases experienced the following trajectory of
events: horizontal mobilization (which was countered by low-level violence from the
government’s regular forces), followed by expanded mobilization and selective regime
violence, then, low-level regime violence, followed by expanded anti-regime mobilization. This
is the intersection where the Egyptian and Syrian cases diverge and Syria’s internal conflict
transitions to civil war.
Experts on civil war emphasize conditions that can facilitate mobilization among
potential insurgents, including the role of incentives (private benefits) from conflict and the role
of state strength in increasing the costs of protests and deterring potential threats to a monopoly
over state resources. Incumbent disincentives which could previously be counted on to deter
mobilization—including the use of low-level selective violence—were not broadly effective,
despite being applied similarly to previous periods of domestic instability. Regime efforts to
flesh out effective deterrents (to organization in the name of political grievance) failed in the
early stages of the conflict. The antidote of state repression was insufficient because the
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particular structural characteristics typically afforded to the regime were no longer available,
affecting state capacity negatively. This, coupled with the rewards structure associated with
anti-regime mobilization, set into motion the necessary conditions required for a durable
insurgency.
The two-sided competition for power at the onset of hostilities began between proregime and pro-revolutionary forces. The first phase of the war was characterized by less
complicated allegiance structures. When the war began to garner international intervention in
the form of economic and military sanctions by various actors, the patterns of allegiance
became endogenously based. In the escalation period, the splintering of rebel groups became
more muddled by the rise in factions participating in the competition for state resources. To this
extent, UNSC sanctions and the freezing of regime officials’ bank accounts resulted in an
increased dependence on shadow economic actors.
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